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Abstract 
This study explores a new dataset in order to present the comparative determinants of growth 
quality in 93 developing countries for the period 1990-2011. We employ both cross-sectional 
and panel estimation techniques with contemporary and non-contemporary specifications. The 
determinants are quite heterogeneous in significance and magnitude with substantial 
inclinations to specifications and estimation techniques. We present and discuss the findings 
in increasing magnitude of significance so as to ease comparative readability. We also discuss 
how specificities in the modelling techniques are relevant for targeting growth quality. The 
results are timely and relevant for the post-2015 inclusive and sustainable development 
agenda.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The study on determinants of the quality of growth index (QGI) documented by Mlachila et 
al. (2014) leave room for improvement in three areas: (i) data, (ii) methodology and (iii) need 
to report and interpret estimated coefficients (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a)
1
. First, the 
relevance of improving data is threefold. (i) We provide determinants based on 17 
fundamental characteristics (or sub-panels) of development as opposed to the 7 documented 
by the underlying study (p. 30)
2
.  In addition to those clearly articulated but unexploited by 
the underlying paper
3
, we also derive three sub-panels based on time-consistent ‘quality of 
growth’ performance that are not explicitly circumvented (p. 16). These include: Best 
Performers, Hopefuls and Contenders in growth quality
4
. The interest of doing so is to 
provide more options to policy makers. (ii) The dimension of social spending used in the 
paper is decomposed into its educational and health components to provide more room for 
policy implications. (iii) The underlying study introduces the ‘rule of law’, ‘corruption-
control’ and ‘aggregate institutional quality’ into the same specifications. This results in 
issues of multicollinearity owing to high degrees of substitutions among the variables. We 
avoid this specification issue in order to prevent estimated coefficients (with a high degree of 
substitution) emerging with unexpected signs.  
                                                 
1
 The QGI is composed of two main components, notably: (i) growth fundamentals (strength, volatility, sectoral 
composition and demand composition) and (ii) social outcomes (health and education). Hence, the proposed QGI 
entails both social dimensions and the intrinsic nature of economic growth. Accordingly, the QGI goes beyond 
the well established Human Development Index (HDI) developed by the United Nations by not exclusively 
concentrating on the levels of incomes, but also on the very nature of growth. 
2
 The 17 fundamental characteristics are sub panels by which the dataset is disaggregated. This include Growth 
Quality (GQ) performance (Hopefuls (Hope), Contenders (Cont) and Best performers (Best)); State fragility 
(Fragile (Frag) and Non-Fragile (Non-Fragile) countries); resource-wealth (Resource-rich (RR), Resource-poor 
(RP)); income levels (Low-income (LIC), Middle-income (MIC), Lower-middle-income (LMIC) and Upper-
middle-income (UMIC); regions (Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Middle East & North Africa (MENA), Asia & 
Pacific (AP), Central & Eastern Europe (CEE) and Latin America(LA)) and non-overlapping intervals (1990-
1994; 1995-1999; 2000-2004 & 2005-2011). 
3
 Fundamental sub-panels are depicted in Figures 2-3 (pp. 13-14) and Figure 4 (p. 16). We employ ‘underlying 
study’ and Mlachila et al. (2014) interchangeably.  
4
 Best Performers, Hopefuls and Contenders are respectively groups of countries with high, intermediate and low 
performance in terms of growth quality. The qualification is based on Figure 4 of Mlachila et al. (2014, p. 16). 
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 Second, on the methodological front, the regressions employed are one lagged non-
contemporary Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimations for the Full sample (p. 21) and 
contemporary estimations for 7 sub-samples (p. 30). We improve this dimension in three main 
areas: data structure, time-oriented specifications and a complementarity of OLS. (1) Both 
cross-sectional and panel specifications are employed in the current study. The former is time-
dynamic to enable an appreciation across time. (2) The specifications are both contemporary 
and non-contemporary to offer more insights into the linkages. (3) OLS are complemented 
with Fixed Effects (FE) or Random-Effects (RE) regressions depending on the outcome of the 
Hausman test for endogeneity. The adopted FE regressions control for the unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
 Third, we do not limit the reporting and interpretation of estimated coefficients to their 
signs (p. 30).  Hence, we also discuss their magnitudes across specifications and fundamental 
characteristics. Building on the above, this study investigates the determinants of quality of 
growth in developing countries with particular emphasis on fundamental characteristics of 
inclusive growth.  
The policy relevance of the study builds the fact that the conception, definition and 
measurement of ‘inclusive growth’ employed as the  outcome indicator in this study is in line 
with at least six of the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), namely: Goal 
1(‘end poverty in all its forms everywhere’), Goal 2 (‘end hunger, achieve food security and 
improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture’); Goal 3 (‘ensure healthy lives and 
promote well-being for all ages’); Goal 4 (‘ensure inclusive and equitable quality education 
and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all’); Goal 8 (‘promote sustained, inclusive 
and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all’ ) 
and Goal 10 (reduce inequality within and among countries) (see Asongu & Le Roux, 2017).  
5 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following manner. Contemporary issues 
on growth and inclusive development are covered in Section 2.  Section 3 discusses the data 
and methodology. The empirical analysis and discussion of results are covered in Section 4. 
Section 5 presents concluding implications.  
 
2. Contemporary issues in growth and inclusive development 
The transition from Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to SDGs after 2015 calls for 
inclusive growth strategies because sustained growth is sustainable when it is inclusive: “In 
fact, sustained growth plus inclusive growth is sustainable growth, which is the objective 
dimension of sustainable development” (Asongu et al., 2014, p.11).  This narrative is 
consistent with the substantially documented critical dimension of income-inequality in 
growth-poverty relationships (Thorbecke, 2013). In essence, because the growth elasticity of 
poverty is lower than the inequality elasticity of poverty, the poverty-growth nexus is a 
decreasing function of inequality (Fosu, 2015; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a). The assertion 
has been consistently verified and confirmed in developing countries
5
.  
The association of output with negative income externalities or “immiserizing growth” 
reminds scholars of Lewis: “Output may be growing, and yet the mass of the people may be 
becoming poorer” (Lewis, 1955).   “Lewis led all developing countries to water, proverbially 
speaking, some African countries have so far chosen not to drink” (Amavilah, 2014, p. 2). In 
essence, the recent evidence of Africa ‘being on time’ for some MDGs extreme poverty 
targets (Pinkivskiy & Sala-i-Martin, 2014) is also being contrasted with stylized facts 
                                                 
5
 The conclusions are valid for African (Fosu, 2008, 2009, 2010a, 2010b) as well as a broader sample of 
developing nations (Fosu, 2010c). The interested reader can refer to, inter alia: “The study finds that the 
responsiveness of poverty to income is a decreasing function of inequality” (Fosu, 2010b, p. 818); “The 
responsiveness of poverty to income is a decreasing function of inequality, and the inequality elasticity of 
poverty is actually larger than the income elasticity of poverty” (Fosu, 2010c, p. 1432); and “In general, high 
initial levels of inequality limit the effectiveness of growth in reducing poverty while growing inequality 
increases poverty directly for a given level of growth” (Fosu, 2011, p. 11).  
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documenting that inequality is limiting the equal distribution of fruits from economic 
prosperity (Blas, 2014)
6
.  
Recent inclusive growth literature has focused on, inter alia: gender inequality 
(Anyanwu, 2014a, 2013a; Baliamoune-Lutz, 2007; Baliamoune-Lutz, 2007 & McGillivray, 
2009; Elu  & Loubert, 2013), relationships between finance, growth, employment and poverty 
(Odhiambo, 2009, 2011), the role of finance in poverty  eradication (Odhiambo, 2010a, 
2010b, 2013; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017b, 2017c), linkages between mobile banking,  
human development and information technology in inclusive development (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2017c; Asongu & Le Roux, 2017), correlates of poverty (Anyanwu, 2014b, 
2013b), debates over absolute pro-poor (Ravallion & Chen, 2003) versus relative pro-poor 
growth (Dollar & Kraay, 2002)   and measurements and determinants of inclusive growth 
(Anand et al., 2013; Mlachila et al., 2014). The last strand is closest to the present inquiry 
which assesses determinants of inclusive growth in developing countries.    
An inclusive growth indicator that accounts for inequality has been proposed by 
Anand et al. (2013). It is motivated by an underlying literature on the need for inclusive 
growth to encompass growth that reduces poverty sustainably (Kraay, 2004; Berg et al., 
2011ab). The adopted concept of growth in the measurement is absolute pro-poor growth, 
maintains that for growth to be inclusive it must benefit the poor absolutely (Ravallion & 
Chen, 2003). The authors have argued that the alternative version or relative pro-poor growth 
which maintains that growth is inclusive only when it mitigates inequality through positive 
income benefits for the poor (see Dollar & Kraay, 2002), could be associated with sub-
optimal externalities for majority of poor and rich households. Moreover, the definition of 
inclusiveness and conception of inclusive growth encapsulate characteristics, like: equal 
                                                 
6
 It is also important to note that, narratives of the African growth miracle are contingent on the periodicity of 
study (Young, 2012). Therefore, compared to the 1980-2010 period, the continent’s relative better poverty 
decline with respect to other regions of the World depends on its growth resurgence which began in the mid-
1990s (Fosu, 2015, p. 44). A narrative that is consistent with recent evidence on countries in the continent 
converging with the USA only from the mid-1990s (Alan & Carlyn, 2015, p. 598). 
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opportunities, equity, employment transitions and market protection. Hence, the inclusive 
growth measurement entails increasing growth and economic expansion via level-playing 
fields of employment, evolving investment and productivity (Anand et al., 2013).  
Mlachila et al. (2014) have complemented Anand et al. (2013) by combining previous 
concepts, definitions and appreciations of pro-poor growth into a new indicator, termed 
‘quality of growth’. The index also builds on an evolving literature on inclusive growth (see 
Ianchovichina & Gable, 2012; Commission on Growth & Development, 2008). Building on 
the evidence that growth in sub-Saharan Africa has not been associated with reduction in 
inequality, poverty and unemployment (Dollar & Kraay, 2002; Martinez & Mlachila, 2013; 
Dollar et al., 2013; Ola-David & Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2014), the indicator considers inclusive 
growth as pro-poor growth that is high, durable and socially friendly. Therefore, according to 
the narrative, certain features are essential for growth quality, among others: strength, 
stability, growing productivity, sustainability and socially-friendly outcomes like better living 
standards and poverty reduction. The present inquiry extends Mlachila et al. (2014) because it 
has incorporated social dimensions into the intrinsic value of growth.  
 The positioning of the inquiry complements the literature which has criticised 
Piketty’s literature by emphasising the need to include developing countries in the debate. 
Piketty’s celebrated ‘capital in the 21st century’ (Piketty, 2014) has substantially debunked the 
Kuznets’ (1955, 1971) orthodoxy on an inverted U-shaped nexus between inequality and 
industrialization, paving the way to many evolving strands in the literature. (i) The causes of 
inequality, inter alia: globalization-driven debts, theorized by Azzimonti et al. (2014) in 
OECD
7
 nations and partially confirmed in African countries (Asongu et al., 2015) and 
adulterated democracy (Stiglitz, 2014). (ii) The consequences of inequality, like increasing 
poverty and diminishing growth (Ncube et al., 2014).  (iii) Commentary-based responses such 
                                                 
7
 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.  
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as cross-checking of facts (Branko, 2014;  Krusell & Smith, 2014), reviews  (Allen, 2014;  
Homburg, 2014) and data quality analysis (Reynolds, 2014).  (iv) The neglect of developing 
countries where the poor by Piketty’s standard is super-rich in some developing countries 
(Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b). 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data and fundamental characteristics  
 We investigate a sample of 93 developing nations with data from Mlachila et al. 
(2014) for the period 1990-2011. The publicly available dataset is in non-overlapping 
averages: 1990-1994; 1995-1999; 2000-2004 and 2005-2011. The authors have computed the 
quality of growth index (QGI) using data from various sources, among others: World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank, Barro and Lee (2010), Sala-i-Martin (2006), the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) World Economic Outlook database and the United 
Nation’s (UN’s) COMTRADE database.  
 Two steps are followed in the construction of the QGI, notably: the first set of 
variables are standardized to produce indices of symmetric scale and (ii) then aggregated 
using different weights to derive a single composite index. It is important to note that the 
plethora of indicators used is not expressed in the same units in order to achieve the 
aggregated single index. Two main approaches are employed to tackle the concern of 
different measurement units, namely: the Min-Max approach and the Z-score or centered-
reduced normalization approach.   
 The dependent variable is the QGI while determinants which are consistent with the 
underlying study include: health spending, education spending, inflation, government 
stability, foreign direct investment (FDI), private domestic credit, remittances, quality of 
bureaucracy, foreign aid, and rule of law. A complete definition of the variables is presented 
in Appendix 1. 
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 As discussed in the introduction, two main differences characterize the dataset, relative 
to the underlying study. First, we have disaggregated the variable of social spending into its 
education and health components. Second, we do not incorporate indicators with a high 
degree of substitution
8
. Hence, we have used the rule of law indicator and dropped 
corruption-control and aggregated institutional quality because the three are highly 
correlated.   
 The independent variables used by the underlying study which are in accordance with 
Anand et al. (2013, p. 16) are justified by a bulk of inclusive growth literature. With the 
exception of inflation which should naturally mitigate growth quality because of decreasing 
purchasing power, other determinants should have expected positive signs for the most part.  
It should be noted that only high inflation potentially mitigates growth quality. Accordingly, 
low/stable inflation may have positive income-equalization effects because it stimulates 
private consumption and investment needed to boost economic growth (Asongu, 2013). The 
justifications provided for the positive signs are based on a broad stream of inclusive growth 
literature (Barro & Lee, 2000; Anand et al., 2012; Mishra, et al., 2011; Calderon & Servén, 
2004; Dollar & Kraay, 2003; Seneviratne &  Sun, 2013; Levine, 2005; IMF, 2007; Hausmann 
et al., 2007).  
 As maintained by the IMF (2007) and Anand et al. (2013), macroeconomic stability, 
structural change and human capital are important pro-poor growth drivers in developing 
nations. While the second (or structural change) embodies globalisation (trade openness & 
FDI) the first and third entail features that have been documented as growth factors in the 
catch-up literature (educational levels, fixed investment and technological change). Other 
macroeconomic fundamentals and structural features entail: financial development (Levine, 
                                                 
8
 It is important to note that social spending is used by Mlachila et al. (2014). (Please see Table 3 on page 21 of 
the study). Accordingly, in the assessment of the determinants by Mlachila et al. (2014), the two (health and 
education) dimensions are considered as a social composite component. We steer clear by using the education 
and health components independently.  
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2005); inflation and volatility of output (Dollar & Kraay, 2003; Barro & Lee, 2010); 
improving status in the value chain ladder of commodities (Hausmann et al., 2007; Anand et 
al., 2012); infrastructural quality improvement (Seneviratne & Sun, 2013; Calderon & Servén, 
2004) and modernizing production processes (Mishra et al., 2011).  
 Appendix 2 presents the summary statistics which shows that the variables are 
comparable based on some considerable degree of variation. Hence, we can be certain that 
some reasonable estimated linkages would emerge. Potential concerns of multicollinearity are 
mitigated with the correlation matrix in Appendix 3. Sub-panels are based on five criteria 
from which we derive 17 fundamental features
9
. The multiple characteristics enable us to 
extend concerns about heterogeneity in factors presented in Table 3 (p. 21) of the underlying 
study. The additional features which are derived from Figures 2-3 (pp. 13-14) and Figure 4 (p. 
16) include: GQ performance (Hopefuls (Hope), Contenders (Cont) and Best performers 
(Best)); State fragility (Fragile (Frag) and Non-Fragile (Non-Fragile) countries); resource-
wealth (Resource-rich (RR), Resource-poor (RP)); income levels (Low-income (LIC), 
Middle-income (MIC), Lower-middle-income (LMIC) and Upper-middle-income (UMIC); 
regions (Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Middle East & North Africa (MENA), Asia & Pacific 
(AP), Central & Eastern Europe (CEE) and Latin America(LA)) and non-overlapping 
intervals (1990-1994; 1995-1999; 2000-2004 & 2005-2011).  
 
3.2 Methodology 
Contemporary and non-contemporary comparative determinants are assessed from 
both cross-sectional and panel specifications. While panel specifications are contemporary 
and non-contemporary, cross-sectional regressions are only non-contemporary owing to the 
nature of the data structure. In the former specifications, Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors OLS are used to complement Fixed Effects 
                                                 
9
 For lack of space, a table on the fundamental characteristics can be provided upon request.  
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(FE) regressions. A Hausman test is employed to assess the presence of endogeneity prior to 
the FE specifications that control for the unobserved heterogeneity. The cross-sectional 
contemporary regressions are Heteroscedasticity-consistent.  
The following are steps in the estimation process. 
Step 1: Cross-sectional contemporary determinants (Table 1) 
iij
j
ji WQGI   

,
10
1                               
(1) 
 
This OLS estimation is based on Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors (SE) 
 
Step 2: Baseline Panel contemporary determinants (Table 2) 
 
titij
j
jti WQGI ,,,
10
1
,   
                            
(2) 
 
Where: tiQGI ,  
 is the Quality of Growth Index for country i
 
at period t ; is a constant,
 
W  is 
the vector of determinants and ti ,  the error term.  
 
Step 3:  Baseline Panel non-contemporary determinants (Table 3) 
 
titij
j
jti WQGI ,1,,
10
1
,   


                         
(3) 
 
Eqs (2) and (3) are based on HAC standard errors OLS.  
 
Step 4: Panel Fixed Effects contemporary determinants (Table 4) 
 
tititij
j
jti WQGI ,,,
10
1
,   
              
(4) 
 
Where, i is the country-specific effect and t is the time-specific effect. 
 
 
Step 5: Panel Fixed Effects non-contemporary determinants (Table 5) 
 
tititij
j
jti WQGI ,1,,
10
1
,   


           
(5) 
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Eqs (4) and (5) are based HAC standard errors with control for both country-specific and time 
effects. The choice of the Fixed Effects model is justified by a significant Hausman test for 
endogeneity.  
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1. Cross-sectional determinants  
 
Table 1 below which presents cross-sectional regressions based on Eq. (1), broadly confirms 
findings of the underlying study, with the exception of inflation (rule of law) that has a 
positive (negative) effect. It provides three clarifications in relation to the underlying paper, 
notably: (i) the positive correlation of domestic credit is most apparent in the period 2005-
2011; (ii) the positive correlation of FDI is more visible in the periods 1995-1999 and 2000-
2004; (iii) the negative correlation of foreign aid is not apparent during the 2005-2011 
interval and (iv) the rule of law is negatively linked to growth quality in the initial period 
(1990-1994). 
“Insert Table 1 here” 
 
4.2 Panel determinants  
 
Table 2, Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 below respectively present ‘baseline contemporary 
determinants in HAC SE OLS’10, ‘baseline non-contemporary determinants in HAC SE OLS’, 
‘HAC SE Panel FE’11 contemporary determinants’ and ‘HAC SE Panel FE’ non-
contemporary determinants. Tables 2-5 are also respectively consistent with Eqs. (2)-(5).  Our 
three-step line of interpretation is simple to follow. For every table and in chronological order, 
we discuss: (i) expected and unexpected signs; (ii) the findings in relation to the underling 
paper and (iii) comparative evidence between sub-samples in terms of signs and magnitudes.  
                                                 
10
 Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) Standard Errors (SE) Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS). 
11
 Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) Standard Errors (SE) Panel Fixed Effects (FE). 
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The following can be established for Table 2. First, the estimated coefficients in terms 
of expected signs are very heterogeneous. Second, the findings are also not broadly consistent 
with the underlying paper. Third, we compare the estimates in chronological (or from 
education to bureaucracy) and increasing order of magnitude in significance. (i) Education 
spending is positively (negatively) significant for LIC, SSA and Contenders (LA & Best 
Performers). (ii) Health spending is consistently positive in: LA, RP, UMIC, NFrag, Full 
Sample and Contenders. (iii) With the exception of LA, government stability is positive in: 
{NFrag, Full Sample}
12
, Contenders, LIC, SSA, Hopefuls and AP. (iv) The effect of inflation 
is consistently positive: MIC, {NFrag, Full Sample}, Hopefuls, {RP, LIC}, SSA and AP. (v) 
With the exception of  Contenders, the impact of domestic private credit is also 
overwhelmingly positive: SSA, {RP, Hopefuls}, LIC, {NFrag, Full Sample}, LIMC, RR and 
MENA. (vi) The impacts of FDI are also consistently positive: Full Sample, {LA, LMIC, 
NFrag, Contenders}, {Best Performers & MIC}. (vii) On the incidence of remittances, but for 
LA, the following are appealing: RP, Contenders, {Hopefuls, LIC} and UMIC. (viii) 
Excluding AP, foreign aid has a negative impact in: Hopefuls, {SSA, LIC}, LMIC, {RP, 
NFrag, Full Sample}, RR and UMIC. (ix) The rule of law is sparingly negative in: Hopefuls 
and Contenders. (x) The impact of bureaucratic quality is consistently positive in: Hopefuls, 
SSA, LIC, RR, RP, Full Sample, LA, NFrag and UMIC.  
 
“Insert Table 2 here” 
 
 
In Table 3 below showing non-contemporary OLS regressions, we have failed to 
provide findings for the CEE and Fragile countries because of issues in degrees of freedom. 
We use ‘nsa’ (not specifically applicable) to denote this concern. This further highlight the 
issues of publication bias in social sciences raised in the introduction (Rosenberg, 2005). 
                                                 
12
 Two or more fundamental characteristics in ‘{}’ denote sub-panels with the same sign and magnitude.  
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Within this framework, the concern of the bias is based on strong results versus null results 
(Franco et al., 1991).  In what follows, we discuss the findings with particular emphasis on the 
comparative element of the line of inquiry. Hence, in addition to following our simple three-
step line of interpretation, we also present comparative evidence with respect to Table 2. 
The following can be established for Table 3. First, the estimated coefficients in terms 
of expected signs are very heterogeneous. Second, the findings are also not broadly consistent 
with the underlying paper. Third, with additional emphasis on Table 2, we compare the 
estimates in chronological (or from education to bureaucracy) and increasing order of 
magnitude in significance.  
(i) Education spending is positively (negatively) significant for LIC, Hopefuls and 
SSA (Best Performers, LA & UMIC). In relation to Table 2, Hopefuls replace Contenders in a 
previously third place of positive effects; while UMIC appears in the rankings and the effect 
in Best Performers is now less negative in relation to LA.  
(ii) Health spending is consistently positive in: {Full Sample, NFrag}, UMIC, LA, RR 
and AP.  In relation to Table 2, RP and Contenders are now replaced by RR and AP. The 
order of increasing positive magnitude has also changed substantially (previously: LA, RP, 
UMIC, NFrag, Full Sample & Contenders).  
(iii) With the exception of UMIC, government stability is positive in {NFrag, Full 
Sample}, LIC, SSA, Hopefuls, RR and AP. UMIC replaces LA in the negative effect while 
Contenders (RR) leaves (enters) the rankings. But the order of magnitude in significance 
remains unchanged (previously, {NFrag, Full Sample}, Contenders, LIC, SSA, Hopefuls & 
AP).  
(iv) With the exception of UMIC, the effect of inflation is consistently positive: SSA, 
Hopefuls, MIC, {LMIC, RP, NFrag} and Full Sample. Now the effect in one of the regions is 
15 
 
negative (UMIC), LMIC replaces MIC while AP leaves the rankings. The corresponding 
order in Table 2 was:  MIC, {NFrag, Full Sample}, Hopefuls, {RP, LIC}, SSA and AP.  
(v) Domestic private credit is consistently positive in {SSA, RP}, MIC, NFrag, Full 
Sample, Hopefuls, UMIC, LIC, NFrag, LIMC, RR and MENA. In relation to the previous 
table: the negative effect of Contenders is no longer apparent, UMIC and MIC enter into the 
rankings, while the MENA leaves (previously: SSA, {RP, Hopefuls}, LIC, {NFrag, Full 
Sample, LIMC}, RR and MENA).   
(vi) But for AP, the effect of FDI is positive in: Full Sample, NFrag, MIC, RP, UMIC 
and MENA. In relation to the contemporary findings, a substantial number of sub-panels enter 
(leave) RP, UMIC & MENA (LA, LMIC, Contenders & Best Performers) the rankings. The 
previous rankings are consistently positive in increasing order of: Full Sample, {LA, LMIC, 
NFrag, Cont}, {Best Performers & MIC}.  
(vii) The impact of remittances is now: positive in the Hopefuls and negative in LA & 
UMIC, it was previously negative in LA and positive in RP, Contenders, {Hopefuls, LIC} & 
UMIC.  
(viii) In addition to AP, the foreign aid effect is now also positive in UMIC, and 
negative in SSA, {LIC, Hopefuls}, {NFrag, Full Sample}, RP, RR, LMIC and MIC.  
Hopefuls and MIC now enter into the rankings while, the impact in UMIC becomes positive. 
(ix) The rule of law which was sparsely negative (in Hopefuls & Contenders) is now 
more apparently negative (in Hopefuls, MENA, Contenders & LA) and positive in UMIC. 
(x) Similar to the contemporary findings, the effect of bureaucratic quality is also 
consistently positive with fewer sub-panels: SSA, LA, Full Sample, NFrag, RP and UMIC. 
Accordingly, Hopefuls, LIC and RR leave the rankings.  
 
“Insert Table 3 here” 
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Due to substantial issues in degrees of freedom in the specification of some panels in 
Tables 4-5, we relax the third point of the three-step line of interpretation and discuss 
comparative findings of both tables simultaneously. In addition, for more subtlety in the 
policy implications, we relate Tables 2-3 to the corresponding discussions in the light of how 
the modeling technique actually affects the positive significance of the results. Overall, the 
results substantially differ from those in Tables 2-3. This implies ‘country specific’- and time-
effects significantly influence the determinants in their effects on the QGI. As stated earlier, 
the choice between the Fixed Effects (FE) and Random Effects (RE) model is determined by 
the outcome of the Hausman test. A rejection of the null hypothesis of the underlying test 
implies the FE model is a better fit. In spite of issues in degrees of freedom that have affected 
some specifications and the Hausman test, we still present the available findings to mitigate 
any issues of publication bias towards null findings in social sciences.  
The following can be established for Tables 4-5. First, the estimated coefficients in 
terms of expected signs are very heterogeneous. Second, the findings are also not broadly 
consistent with the underlying paper. Third, we compare the estimates of both tables in 
chronological (or from education to bureaucracy) and increasing order of magnitude in 
significance.  
 (i) Education spending is positively (negatively) significant for Best Performers (LA). 
The effects of education are more apparent in non-contemporary Fixed Effects (FE) where 
they are positive in: {NFrag, Full Sample}, {LIC, LMIC}, RP, {SSA & Hopeful}.  
           (ii) Health spending is positive (negative) in Hopefuls & LA (RR & Contenders) while 
there are no significant results in Table 5. Hence, FE modeling does not lead to positive 
effects.  
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          (iii) But for LMIC, government stability is positive in {NFrag, & Full Sample} and 
there are no significant results in Table 5. We notice that the determinant in NFrag & Full 
Sample has also been positive in Tables 2-4.  
 (iv) Inflation is only positive (negative) for LA (MIC) in Table 4 (5). This implies that 
accounting for FE does not improve the inflation determinant because we have seen 
overwhelming positive effects in Tables 2-3. 
           (v) But for a positive effect in LA, the impact of domestic private credit is consistently 
negative in RP, {NFrag, Full Sample} & Best Performers. There are no significant results in 
Table 5. This implies modeling with FE overwhelming changes the signs from positive to 
negative.  
 (vi) FDI has positive impacts in RR, Best Performers, Contenders & LA while in 
Table 5 it appears positive only for RP. Two broad policy implications results: contemporary 
modeling leads to more positive effects and FE modeling should also be contemporary. 
            (vii) The effect of remittances is consistently negative in {RP, NFrag, Full Sample}, 
SSA & Contender for Table 4 and in LIC and SSA for Table 5. Overall, a change in modeling 
technique and contemporary character does not substantially affect the negative effect of 
remittances.  
          (viii) The impact of foreign aid is negative in Contenders, Best Performers & LA for 
Table 4 but overwhelmingly positive in Table 5 for {RP, NFrag}, Full Sample; Hope, {SSA, 
LIC} & LMIC. The fact that non-contemporary effects of foreign aid are positive implies 
modeling with FE regressions has more significant and positive effects for foreign aid.  
 (ix) The rule of law is positive (negative) for RP & Best Performers (Contenders & 
LA) and is positive for SSA in Table 5. Hence, in light of preceding tables, modeling the rule 
of law with FE has some appealing results.   
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            (x) But for LMIC & RR that are negative, the effects of bureaucratic quality are 
consistently positive for contemporary FE regressions ({NFrag, Full Sample}, Hopefuls, 
{SSA, Best Performers}, RP, Contenders & LA) and only positive in for Best Performers in 
the corresponding non-contemporary regressions. It follows that the latter set of regressions 
with FE substantially mitigates the positive effect of this determinant that has been 
overwhelming in the preceding tables.  
 
“Insert Table 4 here” 
 
“Insert Table 5 here” 
 
 
5. Concluding implications and future research directions 
 
 We set-out to explore a new database in order to present the comparative determinants 
of growth quality in 93 developing countries for the period 1990-2011. We have employed 
both cross-sectional and panel estimation techniques with contemporary and non-
contemporary specifications. The empirical evidence has been based on 17 fundamental 
features of growth quality derived directly and indirectly from the underlying study 
motivating the inquiry (Mlachila et al., 2014). It is important to note that the impacts of the 
full sample and corresponding effects on each region are not homogenous. It is essentially for 
this reason that we summarize the main results in the concluding section with particular 
emphasis on clarifications of such heterogeneity. In what follows, we discuss concluding 
implications with emphasis on the inclusive development literature. Unless stated otherwise, 
the use of ‘effect’ or ‘impact’ below technically implies the effect or impact on growth quality 
across sub-panels.  
 We have established the following findings. First, from a cross-sectional perspective, 
the four interesting results have been noticeable to elucidate complementary findings to the 
underlying paper. (1) The positive correlation of domestic credit is most apparent in the 
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period 2005-2011. Two factors may explain this correlation. On the one hand, “Banking 
credit to the private sector in Latin America has on average increased by 7 percent of GDP 
from primo 2004 to ultimo 2011, with real credit in some countries growing by up to 20 
percent per year” (Hansen & Sulla, 2013, p. 1). On the other hand, relative to other regions, 
Latin American countries have experienced higher levels of inequality mitigation over the 
past decade (Asongu et al., 2014, p.10). (2) The positive correlation of FDI is more visible in 
the periods: 1995-1999 and 2000-2004. While less visibility in the prior-1995 period could be 
traceable to a substantial drop in Global FDI (Olise et al., 2013, p.1), its absence in the post-
2004 period could be explained by the recent global financial/economic crises. (3) The 
negative correlation of foreign aid is not apparent during the ‘2005-2011’ interval. This may 
be due to the substantial drop in official development assistance due to the 2007-2008 global 
financial crises that later led to economic crisis which persisted through 2011 (Asongu, 
2014b, p. 461). (4) The rule of law is negatively linked to growth quality in the initial period 
(1990-1994). This could be explained by the documented U-shaped nexus between 
democratisation (or governance) and economic growth in developing countries (Fosu, 2001, 
p.289) and growth resurgence in Africa which was experienced only in the mid-1990s (Fosu, 
2015, p.44). Overall in terms of the signs of estimated coefficients, the results broadly 
confirm findings of the underlying study, with the exception of inflation (rule of law) that is 
positive (negative).  
  Second, results based on contemporary and non-contemporary OLS are very 
interesting in articulating the relevance of considering the contemporary character of 
determinants. The determinants are quite heterogeneous in significance and magnitude. They 
have been presented in increasing magnitude of significance so as to ease comparative 
readability. In articulating the comparative relevance of the determinants, which we cannot 
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reproduce here for space constraint, we have enhanced readability by ensuring that the 
findings are simply summarised and easy to follow. 
 Third, the findings of contemporary and non-contemporary panel FE have been further 
compared with those of the two-preceding tables to provide policy makers with some broad 
tendencies on how specification affects the outcome of the 10 determining factors. The 
following have been established. (i) The positive effect of education is most apparent in non-
contemporary FE. (ii) Modelling with FE sparingly produces positive effects from health 
spending. (iii) In almost all the panel models and specifications, we observe that the effects of 
government stability are consistently positive in Non-Fragile states and the Full sample. (iv) 
The positive effect of low and stable inflation is not very apparent with FE modelling. (v) 
Specifying  private domestic credit with FE overwhelming changes the sign of the 
determinant from positive to negative. (vi) On the FDI determinant, one interesting 
implication is noticeable: contemporary modeling results in more positive effects. (vii) 
Changes in modeling technique and the contemporary specification character do not 
overwhelmingly affect the negative effect of remittances.  (viii) The overwhelmingly negative 
effects of foreign aid become consistently positive in non-contemporary FE. (ix) Also, 
modeling the rule of law with FE regressions reveals more positive results. (x) But for non-
contemporary FE regressions, the impact of bureaucratic quality is overwhelmingly positive.  
 In light of the above, we clarify two corresponding implications that are relevant to 
policy makers: contemporary versus non-contemporary and baseline modeling versus FE 
regressions. First, the contemporaneous elements of the specifications are a critical policy 
direction on how to influence growth quality relative to given determinants. Accordingly, we 
have observed that some determinants are positively significant when they are contemporary 
than non-contemporary and vice-versa. Hence, the time-dynamic character of the 
determinants should be given the relevant considerations when targeting growth quality. 
21 
 
Second, we have also found that controlling for country- and time-effects substantially 
influences signs and magnitudes of significance across specifications. Accordingly certain 
variables do correlate better with time- and country-effects than others in the explanation of 
growth quality.  
 Due to space constraints, we further discuss only the unexpected positive signs of 
inflation and foreign aid which are the only determinants in the underlying study with 
negative signs.  First, the puzzle with inflation is the rate of inflation. Accordingly, low and 
stable inflation are needed for sustainable economic growth. Monetarists term it ‘constant 
inflation’ (Congdon, 2014). Stable inflation has also been documented to be favorable to 
inclusive development. Albanesi (2007) has established that high inflation has a disequalizing 
income-distribution impact while according to Lopez (2004) and Bulir (1998), low inflation 
has the opposite effect. Second, foreign aid can be used as an instrument of inclusive human 
development (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017d). This would require inter alia: rethinking 
current development assistance models and orienting developing countries towards 
industrialization according to Piketty (2014), as opposed to Kuznets’ (1955) conjectures on 
the nexus between inequality and industrialization.  
 We set-out to present comparative determinants of growth quality. Given the 
interesting results we have found, there is certainly room for more inquiries with alternative 
methodologies and specification techniques. Moreover, as more data become available, 
estimation approaches that account for the dynamic character of growth quality like the 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) are worthwhile. This is essentially because at least 
five data points are needed to employ the GMM. Unfortunately, the dataset is based on four 
data points.  
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Table 1: Cross sectional regressions (Contemporary determinants) 
         
 90-94 95-99 00-04 05-11 90-94 95-99 00-04 05-11 
 Without Heteroscedasticity Consistency With Heteroscedasticity Consistency 
         
Constant  0.221 0.442** 0.381*** 0.145 0.221 0.442*** 0.381** 0.145 
 (0.398) (0.020) (0.000) (0.365) (0.439) (0.000) (0.020) (0.510) 
Edu. Spending 0.004 0.015 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.015 0.003 0.001 
 (0.916) (0.151) (0.710) (0.907) (0.911) (0.136) (0.700) (0.892) 
Health Spending 0.067 0.003 0.002 0.024 0.067 0.003 0.002 0.024 
 (0.220) (0.819) (0.819) (0.145) (0.245) (0.761) (0.753) (0.188) 
Govt. Stab 0.029 -0.014 -0.005 0.001 0.029 -0.014 -0.005 0.001 
 (0.251) (0.505) (0.683) (0.886) (0.293) (0.407) (0.695) (0.907) 
Inflation (log) 0.052 0.036** 0.019 0.008 0.052 0.036** 0.019 0.008 
 (0.260) (0.016) (0.218) (0.796) (0.340) (0.020) (0.223) (0.848) 
Credit (log) 0.027 0.019 0.026 0.081* 0.027 0.019 0.026 0.081*** 
 (0.721) (0.476) (0.196) (0.056) (0.729) (0.460) (0.198) (0.007) 
FDI -0.037 0.019** 0.010* -0.002 -0.037 0.019*** 0.010*** -0.002 
 (0.305) (0.012) (0.063) (0.659) (0.365) (0.001) (0.000) (0.669) 
Remittances  0.014 0.005 0.005** -0.002 0.014 0.005 0.005** -0.002 
 (0.172) (0.124) (0.033) (0.582) (0.197) (0.100) (0.035) (0.512) 
Foreign Aid  -0.011** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.005 -0.011* -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.005 
 (0.042) (0.000) (0.000) (0.275) (0.069) (0.000) (0.000) (0.138) 
Rule of Law -0.097* -0.002 0.009 0.017 -0.097* -0.002 0.009 0.017 
 (0.061) (0.834) (0.362) (0.413) (0.057) (0.807) (0.338) (0.339) 
Bureaucracy  0.059* 0.041* 0.060*** 0.062** 0.059** 0.041** 0.060*** 0.062*** 
 (0.084) (0.059) (0.006) (0.026) (0.047) (0.015) (0.003) (0.005) 
Adjusted R² 0.658 0.823 0.693 0.517 0.658 0.823 0.693 0.517 
Fisher 4.664** 15.95*** 10.52*** 4.435*** 6.407*** 25.80*** 28.297*** 8.019*** 
Observations  20 60 43 33 20 60 43 33 
         
*,**,**: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Edu: Education. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Gov’t: Government. Log: 
logarithm. 90-94: 1990-1994. 95-99: 1995-1999. 00-04: 2000-2004. 05-11: 2005-2011.  Edu: Education. Gov’t: Government. FDI: Foreign 
Direct Investment.  
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Table 2: Baseline contemporary determinants (HAC SE OLS) 
                  
 Regions Income Levels Resources Fragility Performances Full 
 SSA MENA AP CEE LA LIC MIC LMIC UMIC RR RP Frag NFrag Hope Cont Best Sample 
                  
Constant  0.029 0.353 0.080 nsa 0.710*** -0.022 0.396*** 0.345* 0.129 -0.028 0.225*** nsa 0.133 0.085 0.536*** 0.651*** 0.137 
 (0.610) (0.153) (0.720)  (0.000) (0.804) (0.006) (0.053) (0.346) (0.833-) (0.000)  (0.163) (0.295) (0.000) (0.000) (0.141) 
Edu. Spending 0.016** -0.0004 0.015  -0.008* 0.014** -0.010 -0.014 -0.035 -0.010 0.0008  -0.001 0.012 0.017*** -0.014** -0.0006 
 (0.014) (0.978) (0.699)  (0.055) (0.029) (0.146) (0.106) (0.129) (0.376) (0.901)  (0.846) (0.070) (0.000) (0.032) (0.920) 
Health Spending 0.001 0.0307 0.073  0.012* 0.007 0.015 0.020 0.015** 0.030 0.014**  0.019** -0.0006 0.022** 0.013 0.019** 
 (0.818) (0.113) (0.225)  (0.060) (0.382) (0.102) (0.141) (0.025) (0.215) (0.049)  (0.013) (0.879) (0.016) (0.131) (0.011) 
Govt. Stab 0.023*** -0.009 0.04**  -0.006** 0.017*** 0.001 0.004 0.014 0.014 0.007  0.012* 0.024*** 0.014** 0.001 0.012** 
 (0.000) (0.579) (0.013)  (0.030) (0.000) (0.841) (0.683) (0.423) (0.275) (0.111)  (0.053) (0.000) (0.012) (0.804) (0.048) 
Inflation (log) 0.030*** -0.004 0.094**  -0.003 0.029*** 0.019* 0.023 0.033 -0.014 0.029***  0.023** 0.025*** -0.018 -0.003 0.023** 
 (0.000) (0.869) (0.019)  (0.337) (0.009) (0.092) (0.152) (0.112) (0.478) (0.000)  (0.032) (0.002) (0.144) (0.555) (0.022) 
Credit (log) 0.036*** 0.155** -0.027  -0.014 0.058*** 0.043 0.068* 0.040 0.118*** 0.041***  0.058*** 0.041*** -0.027** 0.011 0.058*** 
 (0.002) (0.037) (0.544)  (0.458) (0.001) (0.116) (0.077) (0.229) (0.000) (0.007)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.535) (0.000) 
FDI 0.0004 0.011 -0.017  0.006*** 0.001 0.008*** 0.006** 0.010 0.0007 0.003  0.006** -0.002 0.006** 0.008** 0.005* 
 (0.863) (0.203) (0.199)  (0.002 (0.779 (0.001) (0.026) (0.209) (0.861) (0.381)  (0.046) (0.343) (0.015) (0.012) (0.067) 
Remittances  0.004 -0.000 -0.004  -0.003*** 0.008** 0.0001 -0.001 0.024* 0.007 0.003*  0.002 0.008*** 0.005*** -0.001 0.002 
 (0.135) (0.994) (0.283)  (0.003) (0.025) (0.925) (0.689) (0.097) (0.143) (0.080)  (0.362) (0.001) (0.000) (0.203) (0.266) 
Foreign Aid  -0.006*** -0.022 0.027**  -0.005 -0.006*** -0.006 -0.008* -0.031* -0.014*** -0.009***  -0.009*** -0.005*** -0.002 -0.004 -0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.207) (0.054)  (0.118) (0.000) (0.123) (0.072) (0.090) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.141) (0.283) (0.000) 
Rule of Law 0.007 -0.013 -0.001  -0.001 0.014 -0.0003 -0.003 -0.008 0.028 -0.001  -0.002 -0.015*** -0.021*** 0.007 -0.001 
 (0.444) (0.280) (0.962)  (0.828) (0.241) (0.966) (0.700) (0.564) (0.150) (0.778)  (0.736) (0.003) (0.000) (0.413) (0.809) 
Bureaucracy  0.036*** -0.122 0.034  0.053*** 0.037*** 0.028 0.010 0.134*** 0.044* 0.048***  0.056*** 0.031**** 0.013 0.001 0.051*** 
 (0.000) (0.183) (0.347)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.150) (0.662) (0.006) (0.051) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.003) (0.242) (0.932) (0.000) 
                  
Adjusted R² 0.741 0.152 0.547  0.776 0.711 0.275 0.165 0.477 0.726 0.730  0.690 0.707 0.751 0.185 0.688 
                  
Fisher  19.055*** 1.270 0.945  8.659*** 16.778*** 3.396*** 1.990* 2.098 11.61*** 24.60***  28.16*** 14.29*** 7.353*** 2.139** 29.23*** 
                  
Hauman test 17.015** n.s.a nsa  nsa 59.82*** 27.31*** 16.837 nsa 327.9*** 82.17***  90.45*** 50.04*** nsa 24.86** 93.72*** 
 (0.074)     (0.000) (0.000) (0.206)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.024) (0.000) 
Countries 23 7 7  9 21 30 22 8 19 32  47 19 9 23 51 
Observations  64 16 18  23 65 64 51 13 41 88  123 56 22 51 129 
                  
*,**,**: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 90-94: 1990-1994. 95-99: 1995-1999. 00-04: 2000-2004. 05-11: 2005-2011. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. MENA: Middle East & North Africa. AP: Asia & 
Pacific. CEE: Central & Eastern Europe. LA: Latin America. LIC: Low Income. MIC: Middle Income. LMIC: Lower Middle Income. UMIC: Upper Middle Income. RR: Resource Rich. RP: Resource Poor. Frag: 
Fragile. NFrag: Non-Fragile. Hope: Hopefuls. Cont: Contenders. Best: Best Performers. Edu: Education. Gov’t Stab: Government Stability. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. HAC SE: Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent Standard Errors. n.sa: not specifically applicable due to shortage in degrees of freedom (matrix is not positive definite). Log: logarithm.  
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Table 3: Baseline non-contemporary determinants (HAC SE OLS) 
                  
 Regions Income Levels Resources Fragility Performances Full 
 SSA MENA AP CEE LA LIC MIC LMIC UMIC RR RP Frag NFrag Hope Cont Best Sample 
                  
Constant  0.070 -1.318 -0.754 nsa 0.713*** 0.014 0.495*** 0.382** 0.570*** -0.110 0.330*** nsa 0.222** 0.07**** 0.712*** 0.599*** 0.217** 
 (0.269) (0.174) (0.123)  (0.000) (0.892) (0.000) (0.031) (0.003) (0.553) (0.000)  (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) 
Edu. Spending(-1) 0.027*** 0.079 0.162  -0.017** 0.022** -0.002 -0.010 -0.044*** -0.018 0.007  0.0040 0.025*** 0.007 -0.015* 0.004 
 (0.000) (0.107) (0.151)  (0.016) (0.027) (0.647) (0.232) (0.001) (0.286) (0.286)  (0.570) (0.005) (0.598) (0.052) (0.538) 
Health Spending(-1) -0.008 -0.037 1.227*  0.021** -0.000 0.009 0.019 0.018*** 0.055* 0.007  0.015* 0.000 0.002 0.016 0.015* 
 (0.206) (0.247) (0.097)  (0.023) (0.991) (0.267) (0.180) (0.002) (0.074) (0.225)  (0.055) (0.983) (0.707) (0.122) (0.051) 
Govt. Stab(-1) 0.021*** 0.068 0.082*  -0.001 0.02*** -0.008 -0.0001 -0.026*** 0.025* 0.003  0.011** 0.024*** 0.007 0.005 0.011** 
 (0.000) (0.286) (0.052)  (0.854) (0.000) (0.415) (0.992) (0.006) (0.097) (0.542)  (0.042) (0.000) (0.235) (0.553) (0.049) 
Inflation (log)(-1) 0.014** 0.053 -0.256  -0.007 0.015 0.020** 0.023* -0.002** 0.006 0.023***  0.023*** 0.017** -0.062 -0.0003 0.024*** 
 (0.038) (0.183) (0.163)  (0.182) (0.187) (0.034) (0.079) (0.043) (0.737) (0.001)  (0.006) (0.051) (0.148) (0.947) (0.004) 
Credit (log)(-1) 0.038** -0.037 -0.107  0.022 0.065*** 0.050** 0.096*** 0.064*** 0.135*** 0.038**  0.050*** 0.056*** 0.015 0.016 0.051*** 
 (0.027) (0.609) (0.486)  (0.315) (0.002) (0.040) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.040)  (0.002) (0.000) (0.692) (0.466) (0.001) 
FDI(-1) 0.009 0.074* -0.370*  0.001 0.004 0.013** 0.002 0.025*** -0.004 0.017***  0.011** -0.002 -0.002 0.009 0.010** 
 (0.124) (0.082) (0.085)  (0.754) (0.538) (0.012) (0.631) (0.002) (0.651) (0.001)  (0.034) (0.667) (0.630) (0.115) (0.036) 
Remittances(-1) -0.002 -0.017 -0.041  -0.005*** 0.003 0.003 0.001 -0.006** 0.005 0.002  0.002 0.006* -0.004 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.530) (0.185) (0.117)  (0.004) (0.560) (0.172) (0.657) (0.018) (0.125) (0.198)  (0.254) (0.071) (0.638) (0.418) (0.208) 
Foreign Aid(-1) -0.003*** 0.030 0.09**  -0.005 -0.004* -0.014** -0.013* 0.023** -0.012* -0.01***  -0.009*** -0.004** 0.008 -0.003 -0.009*** 
 (0.009) (0.383) (0.024)  (0.235) (0.061) (0.031) (0.050) (0.011) (0.057) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.015) (0.283) (0.629) (0.000) 
Rule of Law(-1) 0.008 -0.021* 0.020  -0.024* 0.010 -0.001 -0.014 0.002* 0.015 -0.005  -0.005 -0.014* -0.023** 0.003 -0.004 
 (0.451) (0.080) (0.409)  (0.059) (0.476) (0.868) (0.107) (0.064) (0.491) (0.450)  (0.442) (0.074) (0.046) (0.692) (0.542) 
Bureaucracy (-1) 0.026** 0.593 0.061  0.032** 0.021 0.008 -0.014 0.092*** 0.017 0.036***  0.036*** 0.019 -0.012 0.009 0.035*** 
 (0.010) (0.109) (0.096)  (0.039) (0.200) (0.656) (0.426) (0.002) (0.536) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.145) (0.395) (0.561) (0.003) 
Adjusted R² 0.705 0.371 0.406  0.494 0.560 0.350 0.273 0.999 0.695 0.730  0.683 0.573 0.494 0.186 0.684 
                  
Fisher  11.797*** 1.651 1.820  2.663 6.608*** 3.697*** 2.432** 4845*** 7.393*** 18.91***  20.83*** 6.245*** 2.269 1.937* 21.58*** 
                  
Hauman test 33.154*** nsa nsa  nsa 45.26*** 4.728** 26.9*** nsa 132.8*** 112.8***  85.15*** 31.52*** nsa 20.39*** 89.62*** 
 (0.000)     (0.000) (0.029) (0.007)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries 21 6 6  9 19 28 20 8 16 31  45 17 8 22 47 
Observations  46 12 13  18 45 51 39 12 29 67  93 40 14 42 96 
                  
*,**,**: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 90-94: 1990-1994. 95-99: 1995-1999. 00-04: 2000-2004. 05-11: 2005-2011. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. MENA: Middle East & North Africa. AP: Asia & 
Pacific. CEE: Central & Eastern Europe. LA: Latin America. LIC: Low Income. MIC: Middle Income. LMIC: Lower Middle Income. UMIC: Upper Middle Income. RR: Resource Rich. RP: Resource Poor.. Frag: 
Fragile. NFrag: Non-Fragile. Hope: Hopefuls. Cont: Contenders. Best: Best Performers. Edu: Education. Gov’t Stab: Government Stability. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. HAC SE: Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent Standard Errors. n.sa: not specifically applicable due to shortage in degrees of freedom (matrix is not positive definite). Log: logarithm. 
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Table 4: Contemporary determinants (HAC SE Panel Fixed effects) 
                  
 Regions Income Levels Resources Fragility Performances Full 
 SSA MENA AP CEE LA LIC MIC LMIC UMIC RR RP Frag NFrag Hope Cont Best Sample 
                  
Constant  0.392*** nsa 0.425 nsa 0.168 0.425*** 0.618*** 0.591*** nsa 0.521*** 0.465*** nsa 0.484*** 0.384*** 0.582*** 0.794*** 0.485*** 
 (0.000)  (0.142)  (0.146) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Edu. Spending 0.002  0.033  -0.063** 0.004 -0.004 -0.003  -0.004 0.009**  0.003 0.005 0.015 0.009* 0.002 
 (0.742)  (0.681)  (0.018) (0.430) (0.361) (0.556)  (0.408) (0.050)  (0.484) (0.236) (0.369) (0.052) (0.496) 
Health Spending -0.005  0.031  -0.081* -0.005 0.031 0.029  0.046** -0.004  0.001 -0.015** 0.072** -0.024 0.0003 
 (0.512)  (0.418)  (0.061) (0.362) (0.103) (0.162)  (0.027) (0.481)  (0.81) (0.013) (0.012) (0.141) (0.952) 
Govt. Stab 0.0045  -0.006  0.0005 0.006 -0.005 -0.009**  -0.001 0.003  0.008** -0.003 0.027 -0.0003 0.007** 
 (0.504)  (0.388)  (0.624) (0.331) (0.305) (0.022)  (0.848) (0.363)  (0.026) (0.400) (0.010) (0.932) (0.031) 
Inflation(log) 0.009  -0.039  0.057** 0.008 -0.001 -0.012  -0.016 0.005  0.005 0.012 0.063 -0.002 0.004 
 (0.552  (0.215)  (0.030) (0.547) (0.793) (0.187)  (0.271) (0.483)  (0.481) (0.494) (0.120) (0.333) (0.503) 
Credit(log) -0.027  -0.0003  0.203** -0.038 0.003 0.029  0.0003 -0.019*  -0.021* -0.013 -0.080 -0.043** -0.021* 
 (0.103)  (0.994)  (0.032) (0.003) (0.888) (0.233)  (0.988) (0.085)  (0.085) (0.479) (0.100) (0.027) (0.081) 
FDI -0.001  0.004  0.006** -0.004 0.003 0.002  0.003* -0.0006  0.002 -0.000 0.005** 0.004** 0.002 
 (0.662)  (0.799)  (0.045) (0.176) (0.117) (0.187)  (0.073) (0.847)  (0.401) (0.981) (0.027) (0.038) (0.352) 
Remittances  -0.004*  0.013  -0.003 -0.005 -0.0006 -0.001  0.001 -0.002***  -0.002* -0.002 -0.013* -0.002 -0.002* 
 (0.099)  (0.252)  (0.144) (0.026) (0.432) (0.201)  (0.799) (0.007)  (0.080) (0.288) (0.068) (0.186) (0.055) 
Foreign Aid  -0.0004  0.003  -0.006** -0.0004 0.001 0.002  -0.003 -0.0009  0.0001 -0.0003 -0.001** -0.005*** -0.000 
 (0.710)  (0.777)  (0.047) (0.748) (0.300) (0.267)  (0.125) (0.443)  (0.846) (0.710) (0.034) (0.009) (0.966) 
Rule of Law 0.013  0.024  -0.157** 0.014 0.001 -0.003  0.006 0.013**  0.008 0.005 -0.125** 0.013** 0.008 
 (0.173)  (0.310)  (0.017) (0.044) (0.795) (0.664)  (0.416) (0.011)  (0.135) (0.500) (0.012) (0.025) (0.109) 
Bureaucracy  0.026**  0.049  0.458** 0.030 -0.016 -0.023*  -0.024** 0.034***  0.018** 0.023* 0.141** 0.026** 0.018** 
 (0.048)  (0.371)  (0.020) (0.001) (0.238) (0.055)  (0.018) (0.000)  (0.014) (0.094) (0.045) (0.018) (0.012) 
Time effects  Yes  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Within  R² 0.817  0.957  0.998 0.865 0.831 0.878  0.922 0.818  0.795 0.875 0.969 0.867 0.794 
                  
Fisher  17.40***  9.169  123.22* 33.88*** 20.24*** 23.51***  58.20*** 41.13***  51.34*** 19.51*** 9.307** 18.15*** 49.63*** 
                  
Countries 23  7  9 21 30 22  19 32  47 19 9 23 51 
Observations  64  18  23 65 64 51  41 88  123 56 22 51 129 
                  
*,**,**: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 90-94: 1990-1994. 95-99: 1995-1999. 00-04: 2000-2004. 05-11: 2005-2011. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. MENA: Middle East & North Africa. AP: Asia & 
Pacific. CEE: Central & Eastern Europe. LA: Latin America. LIC: Low Income. MIC: Middle Income. LMIC: Lower Middle Income. UMIC: Upper Middle Income. RR: Resource Rich. RP: Resource Poor. Frag: 
Fragile. NFrag: Non-Fragile. Hope: Hopefuls. Cont: Contenders. Best: Best Performers. Edu: Education. Gov’t Stab: Government Stability. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. HAC SE: Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent Standard Errors. n.sa: not specifically applicable due to shortage in degrees of freedom (matrix is not positive definite). Log: logarithm. 
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Table 5: Non-contemporary determinants (HAC SE Panel Fixed effects) 
                  
 Regions Income Levels Resources Fragility Performances Full 
 SSA MENA AP CEE LA LIC MIC LMIC UMIC RR RP Frag NFrag Hope Cont Best Sample 
                  
Constant  0.389*** nsa nsa nsa nsa 0.406*** 0.643*** 0.912*** nsa 2.019 0.458*** nsa 0.561*** 0.31*** nsa 0.646*** 0.513*** 
 (0.000)     (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.124) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Edu. Spending(-1) 0.019***     0.015** 0.001 0.015*  -0.008 0.016***  0.011** 0.019***  -0.002 0.011*** 
 (0.003)     (0.011) (0.742) (0.060)  (0.422) (0.000)  (0.011) (0.005)  (0.677 (0.006) 
Health Spending(-1) 0.002     -0.000 0.020 -0.001  0.267 0.003  0.003 -0.0005  0.027 0.004 
 (0.680)     (0.997) (0.187) (0.942)  (0.118) (0.410)  (0.487) (0.923)  (0.174) (0.400) 
Govt. Stab(-1) -0.007     0.002 -0.001 0.003  -0.060 0.006  0.006 -0.005  -0.004 0.006 
 (0.392)     (0.747) (0.736) (0.590)  (0.122) (0.183)  (0.135) (0.445)  (0.549) (0.130) 
Inflation(-1)(log) -0.004     -0.002 -0.009*** -0.001  0.297 -0.0009  -0.003 -0.005  -0.006 -0.002 
 (0.751)     (0.845) (0.005) (0.945)  (0.119) (0.850)  (0.512) (0.764)  (0.064) (0.552) 
Credit(-1)(log) -0.016     -0.021 -0.002 -0.116  -0.671 0.0003  -0.013 0.015  0.029 -0.014 
 (0.454)     (0.260) (0.914) (0.210)  (0.160) (0.984)  (0.407) (0.474)  (0.221) (0.361) 
FDI(-1) 0.005     0.012 -0.005 -0.0004  0.028 0.009*  0.0009 0.006  -0.0002 0.0008 
 (0.378)     (0.107) (0.054) (0.875)  (0.208) (0.092)  (0.807) (0.348)  (0.928) (0.826) 
Remittances(-1) -0.007**     -0.006** 0.001 -0.0003  -0.115 -0.003  -0.002 -0.002  0.001 -0.002 
 (0.032)     (0.048) (0.262) (0.881)  (0.101) (0.171)  (0.383) (0.541)  (0.318) (0.271) 
Foreign Aid(-1) 0.005***     0.005*** 0.009 0.007*  -0.044 0.002**  0.002* 0.004***  0.005 0.003* 
 (0.003)     (0.002) (0.080) (0.093)  (0.156) (0.045)  (0.078) (0.007)  (0.190) (0.068) 
Rule of Law(-1) 0.024*     0.007 0.010 0.027  0.140 0.011*  0.012 0.006  0.003 0.011 
 (0.057)     (0.478) (0.204) (0.192)  (0.142) (0.093)  (0.163) (0.634)  (0.430) (0.176) 
Bureaucracy (-1) -0.008     -0.002 -0.016 0.009  0.015 0.005  -0.007 0.0002  -0.020* -0.006 
 (0.538)     (0.849) (0.147) (0.587)  (0.527) (0.384)  (0.474) (0.980)  (0.065) (0.504) 
Time effects  Yes     Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Within  R² 0.877     0.901 0.781 0.758  0.937 0.872  0.766 0.879  0.898 0.765 
                  
Fisher  18.19***     29.16*** 17.77*** 12.33***  16.2*** 52.42***  42.25*** 13.18***  18.69*** 41.97*** 
                  
Countries 21     19 28 20  16 31  45 17  22 47 
Observations  46     45 51 39  29 67  93 40  42 96 
                  
*,**,**: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 90-94: 1990-1994. 95-99: 1995-1999. 00-04: 2000-2004. 05-11: 2005-2011. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. MENA: Middle East & North Africa. AP: Asia & 
Pacific. CEE: Central & Eastern Europe. LA: Latin America. LIC: Low Income. MIC: Middle Income. LMIC: Lower Middle Income. UMIC: Upper Middle Income. RR: Resource Rich. RP: Resource Poor. Frag: 
Fragile. NFrag: Non-Fragile. Hope: Hopefuls. Cont: Contenders. Best: Best Performers. Edu: Education. Gov’t Stab: Government Stability. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. HAC SE: Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent Standard Errors. n.sa: not specifically applicable due to shortage in degrees of freedom (matrix is not positive definite). Log: logarithm. 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Definition of variables 
   
Variable(s) Definition(s) Source(s) 
   
 
Quality of Growth 
Index (QGI) 
“Composite index ranging between 0 and 1, resulting from the 
aggregation of components capturing growth fundamentals and from 
components capturing the socially-friendly nature of growth. The 
higher the index, the greater is the quality of growth” (p. 25). 
 
Mlachila et al. 
(2014) 
 
   
Educational 
Spending 
“Public resources allocated to education spending, as percent of GDP” 
(p. 25) 
Mlachila et al. 
(2014) 
   
Health Spending “Public resources allocated to heath spending, as percent of GDP” (p. 
25) 
Mlachila et al. 
(2014) 
   
Government 
Stability 
“Index ranging from 0 to 12 and measuring the ability of government 
to stay in office and to carry out its declared program(s).The higher 
the index, the more stable the government is” (p. 25). 
Mlachila et al. 
(2014) 
   
Inflation Inflation rate based on the Consumer Price  Index (CPI) Mlachila et al. 
(2014) 
   
Credit to private 
sector 
“Domestic credit to private sector, namely credit offered by the banks 
to the private sector, as percent of GDP” (p. 25).  
Mlachila et al. 
(2014) 
   
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
“Net Inflows of Foreign Direct Investments, as percent of GDP” (p. 25) Mlachila et al. 
(2014) 
   
 
Remittances 
“Workers' remittances and compensation of employees (Percent of 
GDP), calculated as the sum of workers' remittances, compensation of 
employees and migrants' transfers” (p. 25).  
Mlachila et al. 
(2014) 
   
Foreign Aid “Official development Aid actually disbursed, as percent of GDP” (p. 
25) 
Mlachila et al. 
(2014) 
   
 
Rule of Law 
“Index assessing the strength and the impartiality of the legal system, 
as well as the popular observance of the law. The index ranges from 0 
to 6, with a higher value of the index reflecting a higher institutional 
Quality” (p. 25). 
 
Mlachila et al. 
(2014) 
   
Quality of 
Bureaucracy 
“Index of the institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy, 
ranging from 0 to 4. The higher the index, the stronger the quality of 
the bureaucracy” (p. 25) 
Mlachila et al. 
(2014) 
   
 
 
Appendix 2: Summary Statistics 
      
 Mean S. D Minimum Maximum Obs 
      
Quality of Growth Index (QGI) 0.604 0.140 0.258 0.849 372 
Educational Spending  0.612 0.263 0.000 1.000 372 
Health Spending 0.676 0.208 0.089 0.995 372 
Government Stability 18.518 165.55 2.666 2873.8 303 
Inflation (log) 2.331 1.358 -0.637 8.767 339 
Domestic Credit (log) 3.355 0.798 0.529 5.131 345 
Foreign Direct Investment 3.225 4.867 -4.172 62.264 366 
Remittances 4.117 7.391 0.001 63.295 322 
Foreign Aid 4.921 5.771 -9.546 36.317 226 
Rule of Law 3.290 1.060 0.666 5.933 301 
Quality of Bureaucracy 1.693 0.772 0.000 4.000 301 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Obs: Observations.  
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Appendix 3: Correlation Matrix  
            
Educ Health GovStab Infl(log) Credit(log) FDI Remit Aid Law Bureau QGI  
1.000 0.594 0.024 -0.007 0.152 0.048 0.419 -0.014 0.219 0.214 0.098 Educ 
 1.000 0.036 0.032 0.231 0.133 0.265 -0.070 0.214 0.228 0.340 Health 
  1.000 -0.002 -0.007 -0.050 -0.046 0.160 0.355 0.025 -0.119 GovStab 
   1.000 -0.103 -0.111 -0.058 0.088 -0.100 -0.071 -0.003 Infl(log) 
    1.000 -0.047 -0.018 -0.230 0.235 0.464 0.551 Credit(log) 
     1.000 0.134 -0.062 0.130 -0.069 0.038 FDI 
      1.000 -0.027 -0.040 -0.058 -0.033 Remit 
       1.000 -0.059 -0.304 -0.572 Aid 
        1.000 0.256 0.352 Law 
         1.000 0.493 Bureau 
           QGI 
            
Educ: Educational Spending. Health: Health Spending. GovStab: Government Stability. Infl: Inflation. Credit: Domestic Credit. FDI: 
Foreign Direct Investment. Remit: Remittances. Aid: Foreign Aid. Law: Rule of Law. Bureau: Bureaucracy. QGI: Quality of Growth Index.  
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